In the content-centric networking (CCN), the content transmitted between data owners, consumers, and the servers is confidential to its publishers. Therefore, the content's publishers are sensitive to publication of their content to unauthorized consumers and third party service providers. Access controlbased mechanisms have been efficient solutions to address this challenge where the content can be accessed by legitimate consumers only. However, the main limitation with an access control-based solution is that the content itself and the user interests are made public to certain parties in the system. Moreover, the solutions based on access control mechanism are limited within only sharing the content among various publishers and consumers where on the contrary, the secure aggregation of content in CCN is yet to be explored. To address these issues, we describe possible cryptographic solutions for content privacy in CCN, which can share and aggregate the content securely. More specifically, we propose two cryptographic protocols for content sharing and aggregation: 1) cryptographic protocol to exchange the encrypted content (CPE2C) and 2) privacy-preserving aggregation over distributed content (PDAC). The CPE2C protocol is simple yet highly secure against intruders or collusion attacks. This protocol is useful in terms of exchanging sensitive content between a publisher and a consumer. The PDAC is effective for distributed, secure, and energyefficient content aggregation in smart IoT systems leveraging the CCN architecture and cloud services. The privacy analysis and performance results show that the proposed cryptographic protocols perform efficiently without disclosing any private information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information Centric Networking (ICN) or Content Centric Networking (CCN) schemes are getting much attention in both the research community and in industry due to being alternative to existing host-to-host communication architecture [1] . This scheme mainly focuses on information broadcasting and retrieval over a network. The most common and fundamental features in these ICN instances are: (1) interestbased content retrieval, (2) content aware naming and routing at the network layer, and (3) in-network caching. Features interest-based content retrieval and content aware naming and routing at the network layer imply that users acquire content from the network via explicit queries for uniquely named content, rather than by establishing point-to-point connections between endpoints. Innetwork caching permits a router to cache any content for predetermined lengths of time such that subsequent requests for the same content can be satisfied from the cache, rather than by forwarding the interest upstream. These architectural features enable many foreseeable benefits such as lower network cost and improved performance. Users are able to acquire content by requesting explicit interest or names of the content instead of establishing point-to-point connection with another end. A network node (as a router) caches the named content and searches for those contents which have been requested by the users (consumers) and delivers the content upon matching their interests. The main benefits of such scheme is that the cache routers cache the content for a fixed period and multiple requests for the same content can be satisfied from the cache router without communicating with the content's producers. 
A. PRIVACY ISSUES IN CCN
Despite the fact that CCN architecture is beneficial due to its efficiency in routing content from source and destinations without establishing any connection between them, it suffers from certain privacy issues. The important privacy issues remain in the name of content or interest, the content itself and the authenticity of the content producer and content consumer. The content and name privacy can be considered to be data integrity and this can be satisfied if the content or name is not tampered with by random noise. Authenticity can be satisfied if the content receiver or producer is not malicious.
According to the CCN's features, the network nodes or cache routers which are responsible for delivery of the packet data to its consumers can retain the content itself as well as the interests of the content. As a result, there could be two possible privacy leakages caused by the cache routers. First, these nodes might be compromised by any third party intruders and result in confidential information being leaked. Second, the cache router administrator might collude with any user and disclose other users' interests and content for business interests. Figure 1 shows a scenario where a traditional CCN can be compromised in different ways because of its insecure channel and the router's ability to learn the content. The router stores a publisher's content and attributes of the consumer in its storage which are both sensitive information. Moreover, such information is transferred through an insecure channel which could be easy for the intruders to breach and learn the content exchanged in the network.
The current solutions to solve the privacy issues in CCN mostly focus on access control mechanisms and symmetric key encryptions to preserve the privacy of contents and names so that only legitimate consumers are able to access the contents. Although these methods are found to be efficient, we believe that the architecture of CCN can be better designed. In this paper, we propose a Content Centric Architecture that can provide two types of benefits: (i) we do not need to disclose the content to any trusted third-party (which is common in existing secure CCN) (ii) the protocols can perform secure content aggregations to reduce the energy consumption of in-network nodes in CCN without disclosing any private information. In the following section we briefly discuss some of the existing solutions related to these privacy issues.
B. SOLUTIONS TO SOLVE THE PRIVACY ISSUES IN CCN
Access control mechanism is one of the common practices in CCN to preserve content privacy. The content is cached in the middle of the network by the cache routers (which are assumed to be trusted but in practice could be untrusted) and the content producers face difficulties with controlling access to their content. Ion et al. [2] suggested restricting the names of the content to only authorized users. However, that is not sufficient since the names of the content can be discovered easily [3] . To alleviate this, content can be encrypted [4] and only authorized users who hold valid keys can decrypt the content. Similar to [4] , several cryptographic approaches also have been proposed using an Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) scheme [2] , [5] , [6] , broadcast encryption [7] and proxy re-encryption [8] to hide the name and content itself in CCN.
The ABE scheme has been a popular choice to preserve the privacy in CCN due to its unique property of ''encryption with policies''. Here [9] , the identity of a consumer is regarded as a set of attributes. The publisher encrypts the content by selecting some conditions (for example: which category of consumers is able to decrypt). However, the ABE needs a trusted third party to control the mechanism and particularly to check the attributes of users. This trusted party is able to see the content after decrypting the content upon matching it with the attributes of a consumer. Although it is efficient, trusting the third party may not make it practical to use.
The main properties of broadcast and proxy re-encryption are to hide the content and names from the network nodes which are responsible for delivery of the content to its proper recipient. Again, protecting only the names is not enough since any malicious user might pretend to express similar interest. Despite the cryptographic protocols, the content can be randomized with irrelevant content so the intruder cannot find real content from the noisy content. The main challenge with randomization is that it becomes difficult to retrieve the original content from the noisy one. Moreover, this process causes heavy communication overheads [10] .
In summary, the above protocols fail to hide the content from certain parties if the cache router acts maliciously or colludes with other users. Moreover, these privacy-preserving protocols do not describe how to perform any secure computations on the content for aggregation without disclosing private information, for example secure statistical analysis.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
To address the challenges and limitations described above, we propose two different protocols: CPE2C and PDAC. The first one improves the privacy of an existing solution to exchange the content in CCN where the content is made secure using ABE scheme. By enforcing such access control mechanism the content can be made secure from unauthorized parties. However, there has to be one trusted party who controls the mechanism by encrypting and decrypting the content for users which is eventually able to learn about the content and possibly able to harm the system if becomes malicious. Hence, we improve the solution by applying another layer of security by encrypting the content itself before going to the access control layer so that the content can be accessed by legitimate user as well as the content privacy is preserved from any party in the system.
The second protocol shows how to aggregate content in CCN using homomorphic property of public key cryptography without disclosing or learning anything about the content. The main advantage of homomorphic cryptography is that it is possible to perform certain operations on encrypted data such as addition, multiplication and subtraction. Moreover, the public key cryptography is semantically secure, i.e. given the ciphertext it is not possible to identify the original plaintext or content once it is encrypted. More specifically, we describe how the CCN architecture can be applied into smart IoT systems where the published content from various publishers (as sensors) are able to aggregate the content by considering two important constraints: (i) the content aggregation has to be fully secure (ii) the aggregation has to be energy efficient since the sensors are not powerful devices, more specifically we provide the mechanism for secure statistical analysis in CCN for smart IoT system.
D. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II specifically describes the focus and contribution of our paper. Section III discusses elaborately why it is important to aggregate the content in CCN securely and its relation and significance with smart IoT systems. Section IV describes the overall system model and the proposed protocols are described in section V and VI. Section VII and VIII present the privacy and performance analysis respectively and finally section IX concludes the paper.
II. FOCUS OF THIS ARTICLE
As discussed above, the privacy and security of content and names are yet to be analyzed especially against the network cache routers; in this article, we limit our discussion to the privacy preservation of content against the routers and third party service providers. More specifically, we discuss possible cryptographic protocols for ICN where the cache network nodes are not able to learn the content while delivering it to the recipients. We also discuss a possible cryptographic protocol in ICN which is able to perform certain cryptographic operations such as privacy-preserving statistical analysis of the content from all data owners without disclosing its sensitive content. (In this case, we assume the content is numerical.) More specifically, we present two types of cryptographic protocols for CCN.
• Cryptographic Protocol to Exchange the Encrypted Content (CPE2C). In this protocol, we aim to protect content from the cache routers which are responsible for delivery of content to consumers, which preserves the privacy of content against the cache routers as shown in Figure 1 . This protocol is useful for privacy-preserving communication between a data owner and a consumer. More specifically, cache routers cannot collude with thirdparty intruders or malicious users by leaking any sensitive content.
• Privacy-preserving Aggregation over Distributed Content (PADC) in CCN. Although the previous protocol solves the privacy issues shown in Figure 1 against cache routers or third-party intruders, it may not be effective if the publishers and consumers are distributed and if the content needs to be aggregated. Therefore, in PADC protocol, we aim to analyze the privacy requirements and present a secure aggregation mechanism for confidential content from various distributed publishers without leaking any information. To illustrate this protocol, we present a secure statistical analysis (average computation as an example) in CCN.
In summary, we propose a new paradigm for privacypreserving CCN where the system is able to preserve the privacy of data owners, data consumers and the content itself. We discuss the security flaws in traditional CCN and propose possible solutions to overcome these issues. Specifically, in this article we only preserve privacy of content rather than preserving privacy of other types of information in VOLUME 6, 2018 CCN such as names, attributes, interests and queries. Using this protocol, data owners can exchange sensitive content privately to consumers without disclosing it to the cache router or any third-party service providers. Moreover, our framework is able to perform certain statistical analysis in a privacy-preserving manner and exchange the encrypted results as content to its legitimate consumers.
III. SECURE CONTENT AGGREGATION IN CCN
In this section we describe why it is important to aggregate the content securely in CCN and its significance with the emergence of the BigData and smart IoT systems.
1) AGGREGATION DUE TO THE EMERGENCE OF BIGDATA
With the rapid evolution of the big data into current computing technologies, it is becoming highly important for private and public companies to aggregate the data in their very large databases. The companies include different medical colleges, universities, hospitals, government agencies, research and development centers. For example, a medical researcher would like to perform some statistical analysis. In other words, the researcher wants to determine the correlation between the occurrence of a certain disease and a patient's age, food, heart rate or blood pressure. This analysis would certainly be beneficial to both patient and analyst to take necessary measures for the future and improving provision of health-care. Recalling the emergence of big data, it is common that this amount of data is stored over distributed databases and maintained by corresponding data owners. Sharing data would surely help more accurate analyses. However, the problem lies in how to share each others' confidential content securely so that individual privacy can be preserved.
CCN in BigData Aggregation:
Due to the CCN's efficient architecture it would be really beneficial to integrate its network topology for the purpose of secure and efficient content aggregation from different nodes (data owners) to other nodes (consumer).
2) AGGREGATION IN IoT SENSOR NETWORKS
ICN matches a wide set of WSN (Wireless Sensor Networks) or IoT applications that are information-centric in nature, since they target data regardless of the identity of the object that stores or originates them. For example, road traffic/environmental monitoring applications are oblivious to the specific car/sensor that provides the information. We can imagine similar scenarios in other smart IoT systems (as shown in Figure 2 ) such as e-health systems, smart grid systems and smart home systems where different low-powered devices frequently capture content and aggregate them to the base station or any enquirer. The main issue is that a sensor node is severely constrained in terms of computation capability and energy reserves. A straightforward method to collect the sensed information from the network is to allow each sensor node's reading to be forwarded to the base station, possibly via other intermediate nodes, before the base station processes the received data. However, this method is prohibitively expensive in terms of communication overheads (or energy spent).
CCN in IoT:
We can consider the same scenario in CCN where the sensor nodes can be treated as data publishers and the base station can be regarded as the consumer. Instead of processing the data by the in-network nodes to reduce energy consumption, we can use a cloud server to process all the necessary aggregation on behalf of the source nodes. Due to the efficiency of in-network architecture it would certainly be beneficial to perform data aggregation in CCN. Moreover, due to use of a cloud server we have more benefits. First, we do not rely on the processing power of the source devices. Cloud can perform huge operations with its distributed computing facility which will certainly reduce the energy consumption of network nodes. Therefore, we propose a secure aggregation protocol using public key cryptography by which we can make full use of a cloud's processing power to perform cryptographical operations efficiently. Moreover, we use the public key cryptography with homomorphic properties by which the cloud server can perform certain operations on encrypted content without revealing or learning any sensitive information.
IV. THE OVERALL SYSTEM MODEL
We now introduce the entities of our proposed CPE2C and PDAC protocols and their responsibilites.
• Content: This is also regarded as data or information.
More importantly, according to our model we assume the content is privacy-sensitive and the owners are unwilling to share it publicly.
• Data Owner: This term includes the data publisher or producer who owns the content and publishes in the network so that the authorized recipient is able to access the data.
• Consumer: A consumer is another user who is authorized to receive the content published by the data owners. Note that a data owner and a consumer may exchange roles simultaneously, depending on different scenarios.
• TTPS: A trusted service provider which is powered with ABE scheme to control access to the content by consumers.
• Cache Router: The cache router caches the content and delivers it to the consumer with the help of TTPS.
• Cloud Server (CS): A server which has certain processing power on encrypted content and works on behalf of multiple data owners. After completing the secure aggregation on encrypted content, the CS communicates with TTPS and cache router for access control management.
• Service Provider: We use this term throughout this article to indicate both the TTPS and the cloud server as a composite server.
V. OVERVIEW OF CPE2C PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide details of our proposed CPE2C protocol for exchanging encrypted content.
A. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENT
In this protocol we aim to protect content privacy from the TTPS or cache server which is responsible for delivering the content upon matching the owner's policies with the consumer's attributes. This protocol is based on the communication between one-to-one users, i.e. between one consumer and one data owner. We assume that the content is sensitive and that it has to be delivered through the CCN in an encrypted form.
B. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Although the current designs of CCN are efficient, they introduce challenges to the privacy issues to content itself. Figure 3 depicts such a scenario where Fig.3(a) shows an exchange of content between the data publisher and consumer using ABE scheme. However, as discussed earlier, in this protocol the cache router TTPS is a trusted party which is able to access the content since it helps the consumers or owners to generate the required asymmetric keys. The TTPS generates the public key of ABE (PK-ABE) and sends to the publisher. The publisher then encrypts its content with the policies and broadcasts. After this, the TTPS checks the consumer's keyattributes with the access tree of publisher. If the attributes match the policies, TTPS issues a secret key to the consumer to decrypt the content. However, upon matching, the TTPS can see the content. To overcome this challenge, we propose another protocol shown in Fig. 3(b) where the consumer selects a public and a secret key pair of the public key encryption scheme and broadcasts the public key (PK-ASM).
The publisher encrypts its content using that public key and encrypts the resultant cipher, once again using ABE scheme with the access tree (policy). This double-encrypted cipher is then published and TTPS decrypts the cipher using ABE scheme matching the consumer's attributes. Note that after decryption, the TTPS retains only the ciphertext which was encrypted using the consumer's public key (PK-ASM): only the legitimate consumer (who is authorized to access the content) is able to decrypt the content since it was encrypted using the public key of the same pair. Therefore, we still use the ABE scheme but add another layer of privacy so that the TTPS is not able to identify the content. More specifically, we suggest using any public key encryption scheme which supports homomorphic properties since this type of scheme supports secure multiparty computation (SMC). It will be more useful if there are more than two data owners or publishers who want to collaborate to perform some aggregation on their content. Another advantage of using public key cryptography is that it also supports distributed and shared key generation so that any one party does not hold sole power to own the secret key. More details of secure aggregation on distributed content from different data owners and distributed key generation in CCN can be found in the following sections.
VI. OVERVIEW OF PADC PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide details of our proposed PADC protocol, an aggregation mechanism on for confidential content from various distributed publishers.
A. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
In this subsection we introduce the PADC protocol in two different settings. In PADC-1 we assume there are multiple data owners and one consumer. The consumer has the power to generate secret and public key pairs and publishes the public key to the network. The data owners encrypt their content and return the ciphertexts to the service provider. The latter performs secure statistical analysis without The proposed CPE2C protocol where the content is stored as encrypted form inside the storage of TTPS. The content is encrypted using consumer's PK ASM before sending it to the TTPS and intruders are not able to learn the private content.
disclosing any individual content of the data owners. It then checks the consumer by ABE scheme with the attributes and sends the encrypted result of statistical analysis to the authorized consumer. The consumer decrypts the results using its own secret key. In PADC-2, we also perform secure statistical analysis but the difference is that the key pairs are distributed among all participants (data owners and consumers) in the network. In this setting the consumer does not have the power to select the key pairs. As discussed, we assume there are multiple data owners and consumers which communicate and exchange their confidential content via CCN. In this regard we aim to protect the privacy of each participant against one another. No user should be able to learn any content of another user except its own content. We also aim to protect user privacy against the service provider learning any intermediate computational results.
B. THE PADC-1
In this subsection we introduce the secure data-sharing among the consumers and data publishers in the distributed environment where there are multiple data owners. We assume that the content stored by each data owner are patient medical records. The service provider is a composite of cloud server and cache routers. The cloud server is able perform homomorphic operations where the cache router matches the consumer's attributes with the owners' policies. Figure 4 presents our proposed PADC-1 for communication between a consumer and the distributed data owners in a ICN. In this model we have a service provider who is potentially a cloud server, empowered with homomorphic operations. We assume that this cloud server is semi-honest, which means it follows the protocol but tries to learn new values from what it has. In this model we also make sure that it observes the philosophies of ICN, which are decoupling the data owners and consumers for greater data accessibility, efficient data distributions and scalable multiparty communication [2] .
Let us consider the same scenario described earlier in this section: a client who is potentially a researcher wants to learn some statistical results of distributed patient information. Architecture of PADC-1 Protocol. Similar to the previous CPE2C, client publishes public key of asymmetric encryption PK ASM to multiple data owners. All owners encrypt their content using PK ASM and send the ciphertext and policies to cloud server (CS). The CS performs secure aggregation for the data owners and encrypts the resultant ciphertext using PK ABE published by TTPS. The TTPS receives the ciphertext and decrypts using SK ABE by matching with the client's attributes and stores the aggregated ciphertext in router's database. Since the router stores only the encrypted aggregated results, the intruder has no idea about original content even if it is compromised. The CS also stores encrypted results which is decrypted by the client only.
The client sends the query to TTPS which then broadcasts the query to all data owners distributed over the network. However, the data owners make their own choices of what kind of consumers or clients are able to access the data. For instance, the medical information stored by the data owners is for research purposes and data owners may allow only university research students who conduct medical research to access the statistical results. Therefore, the attribute of the consumer or client has to be a legitimate university ID and department code which express that the client is a medical research student. The client broadcasts the public key of asymmetric encryption scheme (for example ElGamal) as PK ASM . The data owners encrypt their individual records and send E(content) PK ASM to the cloud server. The cloud server performs homormorphic operations to produce encrypted statistical results as E(Aggregated content). This encrypted result is sent to the TTPS by encrypting it using ABE scheme as E(E(Aggregated content)) PK ABE . Note that the data owners also send their policies to the TTPS and the access tree is encrypted with the help of the cloud server. Once the client's attributes matches the policies, the TTPS decrypts the ciphertext and gets E(Aggregated content) which is sent to the client. Finally, the client decrypts the aggregated content using its own secret key. Note that the TTPS is unable to decrypt E(Aggregated content) since the corresponding SK ASM is held by the client only. For the public key encryption we can use ElGamal for secure aggregation. The details of the ElGamal scheme are next described.
The ElGamal Cryptosystem [11] consists of three stages: Key generation, encryption and decryption. We define this scheme in terms of a consumer-publisher interaction.
The consumer generates a secret and public key pair of ElGamal scheme as SK = x and PK = {g, y = g x } respectively. The consumer broadcasts the PK to the publisher. Upon receiving the PK , the publisher encrypts its content M and generates ciphertext as (A, B) , where A = g m · y r (r is a random number) and B = g r . After receiving the ciphertexts, the consumer decrypts the content as A B = g m . Using a discrete logarithm process, the consumer is able to retrieve m from g m since g is public.
The main advantage of ElGamal scheme is that it provides semantic security (it is computationally hard to differentiate two ciphertexts from its original message) [12] - [16] . The ElGamal encryption scheme is a probabilistic public key encryption algorithm which is composed of key generation, encryption and decryption. This scheme supports both homomorphic addition and multiplication. For example, given two ciphertexts C 1 = E pk (m 1 ) and C 2 = E pk (m 2 ), the homomorphic addition and multiplication can be defined as:
The main advantage of ElGamal cryptosystem is that it can be used in the distributed environment where there are multiple data publishers and they can share the public key and secret key without actually disclosing the keys. Moreover, we do not rely on the consumer to select the private and public keys. Figure 5 (a) shows a privacy-preserving protocol on how to add two content (m 1 and m 2 ) using the ElGamal scheme in CCN and consumers can decrypt the resultant content by their own secret keys. In Step 1, the consumer generates the VOLUME 6, 2018 public and secret keys. In Step 2, the data owners encrypt their content m 1 and m 2 using the public key of the consumer, and sends it to the service providers. In Step 3, the server performs a homomorphic operation, for example multiplication of two ciphertexts which results in the addition of two plain content data in an encrypted form. Finally in Step 4, the consumer is able to decrypt the resultant content. Note that g is public and uses a discrete logarithm; it is not computationally hard to retrieve m 1 + m 2 .
1) EXAMPLE OF SECURE AGGREGATION IN CCN

2) EXAMPLE OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING AVERAGE COMPUTATION IN CCN
Figure 5(b) shows an illustrative example of average computation in CCN without disclosing any private information. 1 For simplicity, we assume that the contents are integer numbers in this scheme. Firstly, the data owners encrypt their own content using the public key of the consumer and send it to the service providers in CCN. The data owners also send an encrypted flag as E(1)(if there is any content). As shown in Figure 4 , the cloud server multiplies the encrypted content as E(5) · E(4) · E(3) · E(4) and results E (16) . Similarly, the cloud server multiplies the ciphertexts which contain the flags (E(1) . . . E(1)). After performing all necessary computations using ABE scheme, the consumer receives the encrypted results and decrypts the numerator and denominator as 16 and 4 respectively. The consumer 1 We show the average computation as an example of secure statistical analysis. Using a similar protocol it is possible to perform other statistical analyses such as variance, standard deviation and so on.
can perform division on plaintext locally which results in the average computation of all content from the data owners.
3) PITFALLS OF PADC-1 AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The main issues with the above described protocol is that only the consumer holds the public and secret key pair and the consumer has to generate the key pairs each time it sends a new query for any new content. Moreover, this protocol may not be efficient in a scenario where the in-network roles are exchangeable for different network entities. For example, the client in our example is requesting that all data owners share the content. Similarly, any data owner can change its role to a consumer and asks to share content received from other parties. As a result, each time a new user is requesting new content, it has to generate the key pairs. Moreover, only one user holds the secret key. To alleviate these issues another protocol can be applied where all users in the system can have their own key pairs and they can collaborate to generate aggregated key pairs to encrypt or decrypt. Moreover, no single entity has the power to hold the secret key.
C. THE PADC-2 PROTOCOL
The PDAC-2 Protocol can be used where the public and secret key pair is distributed among all participants in the system. The ElGamal scheme as discussed above can be very useful when it needs to generate distributed public and secret keys. The distributed key generation and decryption of ElGamal is described as follows. Distributed public keys are used to generate master public key (step 3) and each data owner encrypts its content using the master key. Once the secure aggregation is completed, all parties can collaborate to decrypt the encrypted aggregated result for client by producing master secret key (step 10) without revealing any secret information.
Distributed Key Generation:
Each participant chooses a secret key sk i where i denotes individual data owners and publishes a public key pk i = {y i = g sk i }.
Master Key Generation : The master public key PK is i y i , which is the product of all individual public keys. The master secret key SK is i sk i .
Hiding Secret Key: Given an encrypted message (A, B) using ElGamal, each party computes B sk i and publishes the results. Note that the secret key is hidden inside the cipher text.
Distributed Decryption: The plaintext is derived by performing . This distributed mechanism helps users to generate their partial public and secret keys and all distributed keys can be transformed into master public and master secret keys by performing the Distributed key generation algorithm. The master public key is used by all data publishers to encrypt their content. The consumer runs the Distributed decryption algorithm to decrypt the content. In below we describe the protocol with distributed public and secret keys step by step as shown in Figure 6. 1) All participants including data owners and consumer runs the Distributed key generation algorithm to generate individual public and secret key pairs. 2) The individual public keys pk are sent to the service providers to generate the master public key.
3) The service provider runs the Master key generation algorithm to generate composite key using all partial public keys from the data owners and consumer. 4) The master public key PK is sent to the data publishers to encrypt their content. 5) In this step the data owners encrypt their content using master public key PK locally. 6) The data owners publishes their content to cloud server for aggregating the content based on the queries of consumer.
7) The cloud server generates the resultant ciphertext (A,B) of aggregated content 2 which will be sent to the consumer using ABE scheme. 8) The cloud server starts running the protocol of hiding secret keys with the data owners. To initiate this protocol, the cloud server publishes one of the ciphertexts B to all data owners and the consumer. 9) The data owners and consumer hide their individual secret keys sk 1 . . . sk 5 inside B by running Hiding Secret Key algorithm and the participants return the resultant ciphertexts to the cloud server which are again forwarded to the consumer. 10) The consumer runs the Distributed decryption algorithm to decrypt the aggregated results. During this operation none of the individual secret key is disclosed.
VII. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Recall that the system model of our proposed protocols consists of several data owners, consumers and a service provider which includes a TTPS (cache router) and a server powered with homomorphic properties. We now discuss the privacy analysis of CPE2C and PADC elaborately. In this analysis we also discuss how much information is or may be leaked to different entities in the system and how the privacy of the content is preserved while performing different operations. We limit our privacy discussion within the public key encryption only which is introduced in this paper. The privacy analysis of ABE scheme is considered as same as the existing works.
A. CPE2C
The CPE2C protocol consists of data owner, a TTPS and consumer. After generating key pairs {PK ASM , SK ASM } using public key encryption, the consumer publishes the public key PK ASM and the owner encrypts the content using this public key as E(m) PK ASM . Here m = E(content) PK ABE which means the content was encrypted using ABE scheme and the encrypted content has been encrypted another time using PK ASM so that the TTPS is not able to find the content even if its malicious. Since the secret key SK ASM is held by the consumer only, the TTPS is not able to learn any information from the encrypted content.
B. PADC
This protocol is divided into two subprotocols: PADC-1 and PADC-2. Similar to the CPE2C, in PADC-1, the consumer publishes its own public key PK ASM and the data owners encrypt their content as E(m 1 ) PK ASM . . . E(m n ) PK ASM where m denotes the content and n denotes the number of data owners, which are sent to the service providers. The cloud server (one of the entities in the service provider) performs statistical operations on the received encrypted data and produces E(f (m 1 . . . m n )) where f (m 1 . . . m n ) denotes any statistical function over the contents. Note that, during this operation, no information is leaked to any party and the cloud server has no idea about the original content except the ciphertext. In PADC-2, each and every user including data owners and the consumer have to generate partial secret and public key pairs as {pk 1 , sk 1 } . . . {pk n , sk n } and produce a master key to encrypt and decrypt the content as PK = pk and SK = sk respectively. Any trusted service provider can generate the keys and produce the masters keys for data owners. The contents are encrypted by the master key as E(m 1 ) PK . . . E(m n ) PK by the data owners. Note that the data owners are not able to learn about other owners content except their own. They send the encrypted content to service provider for aggregation. After the homomorhic operations using distributed ElGamal, the final ciphertext is produced by A, B = E(f (m 1 . . . m n )) where A and B are two ciphertexts for ElGamal which are sent to client. Note that in this stage the servers learn nothing except the ciphertexts. The client broadcasts A to all data owners to share their secret key privately. The data owners computes (A) sk 1 . . . (A) sk n and returns to client. In this way the owners are sharing their secret key without actually revealing it. Now the client performs (A) sk for all data owners which is used to decrypt the aggregated content (shown as Distributed Decryption stage in previous section) without revealing the secret key. Note that at this stage the client decrypts the content without learning any information related to data owners secret keys.
Remark: If any user in the system participates in generating master public key, he/she has to participate in generating the master secret key for decryption. Therefore, if at least one user is honest, other users are not able to collude to decrypt the content.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have conducted a set of experiments of the proposed protocol to check their performances. Recall that the proposed CPE2C protocol only encrypts and decrypts the data on the top of CP-ABE protocol. Therefore, in this case we present the performance of certain public key encryption (ElGamal cryptosystem) and its decryption operations. On the other side, the PADC-1 and PADC-2 protocols not only performs encryption and decryption but also aggregates the contents homomorphically. In our experiments we show the performance in terms of performing secure average computation on the contents where there are multiple data owners holding a set of contents. To conduct the experiments, we use Java 2 SE 8 including cryptographic libraries on a hardware platform with OS windows 7, 64 bit and 3.6 GHz-core i7 and 8GB CPU unit. For the performance measurement, the metrices we considered in our experiment are shown in table 1. The size of each ciphertext and key is considered as l = 1024 bits while measuring the performance. For ElGamal cryptosystem, one encryption operation consists of two modular exponentiation (e).
A. COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY 1) CPE2C
Using the ElGamal public key encryption, the CPE2C protocol encrypts the ciphertext which was encrypted using CP-ABE. For one data publisher, the encryption takes 2e seconds to encrypt one content. For decryption it takes one modular exponentiation e and one modular multipliaction mul. Therefore, in total if there is one data publisher and one data requester, the total cost would be 3e + mul seconds.
2) PADC
Unlike the CPE2C protocol, the PADC protocols consists of n number of content owners. Upon request from client, the owners encrypt their content and send to cloud server. The cloud server performs homomorphic operations to facilitate the secure aggregations. The main difference between PADC-1 and PADC-2 is only managing the secret keys.
In PADC-1, the data owners encrypts their contents in parallel and send total n ciphertexts of all contents. The data owners also encrypt the flags of their content. In total it takes 4e seconds to encrypt in parallel. To perform secure average computation among the content, the server performs n − 1 homomorphic additions (h a ), for both contents and the flags, which takes total 2(n − 1)h a seconds. The client then receives the ciphertexts and decrypts which takes e + mul seconds. Therefore in total, the PADC-1 protocol takes 4e + 2(n − 1)h a + e + mul seconds.
The PADC-2 also works similar to PADC-1 except the key generation and decryption part since it is run based on distributed ElGamal encryption where the secret keys are shared among the data owners and they collaborate their individual public keys to generate master public key. Therefore in terms of computation cost the PADC-2 also requires 4e + 2(n − 1)h a + e + mul seconds to complete the protocol except the fact that it has to compose all individual secret keys to generate master secret key. To facilitate this, the data owners hides the secret keys (as shown in step 9 in Fig. 6 ) which is one modular exponentiation (e). Additionally the client has to perform n − 1 homomorphic additions to compose the individual secret keys which takes (n − 1)h a seconds for decryption. In the last step, the client needs to perform discrete logarithm to recover the content from the decryption results [13] which takes √ T e seconds where T represents the size of the content. Therefore in total the PADC-2 protocol takes 6e + 2(n − 1)h a + mul + (n − 1)h a + √ T e seconds. The table 1 shows the overall computation complexity for each protocol.
B. EFFICIENCY
The efficiency of our proposed protocols are shown in table 1 as well as in figure 7 and 8. To test the scalability and overall performance of our protocol we assume there are 100 data owners and one client. We also assume the content as a small value of size 20 bits of number. To test the performance, we calculate the required time for each entity of the protocols such as data owners, client and server. Note that in our experiment the size of the ciphertext and cryptographic keys is considered as 1024 bits. The lower half portion of table 1 shows the total time required for each participant and overall protocol where the total number of data owner is n = 100. Figure 7 and 8 present more information in terms of scalability for PADC-1 and PADC-2 protocols. Note that, the required time of the data owner does not depend on the n since the data owners can perform their operations in parallel. Also it does not affect the calculation in client side for any protocol. Only the required time of server depends on the total number of data owners since their contents are homomorphically aggregated by the server.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article proposes privacy-preserving protocols for exchanging the content and secure aggregations over the encrypted content in CCN. Our protocols achieve end-to-end user privacy against other users and service providers while exchanging the content via the CCN. Moreover, the service providers are not able to retain any private content while performing secure aggregations over the encrypted content. We present the privacy-preserving protocols in two different scenarios. First, exchange of content in encrypted form between one consumer and one publisher. Second, exchange of encrypted content among more than two users. The privacy analysis shows that the protocols are able to achieve user privacy while exchanging and aggregating the encrypted content in CCN.
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